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Abstract
The relationship between market access and national treatment under the GATS is a loophole
left by the drafters of the agreement. Before 2010, the issue was valuable only in theory, but since
the WTO case of China-Electronic Payment Services, the issue has become a pressing one, and its
value in practice has been closely concerned. This paper analyzes the issue based on GATS Articles
XVI, XVII, XX.2, and two Scheduling Guidelines. It also compares the different approaches to
resolve the issue. After reviewing the Panel Report of China-Electronic Payment Services, the
author argues that a simple, arbitrary approach (mutually exclusive or scheduling primacy) is not
persuasive. The essence of the relationship between market access and national treatment is how far
a WTO Member can go under or beyond its current service schedule, and how to clarify the issue is
more a choice of conservatism or liberalism than a technical one.
Introduction
One of the characteristics of national treatment under the General Agreement on Trade
in Services (GATS) is its complicated relationship with market access. The clear demarca-
tion between market access and national treatment with respect to trade in goods seems to
blur in trade in services. The ambiguity was noted even before the conclusion of the
GATS. During the Uruguay Round of negotiations, the representative of Australia stated,
when discussing trade in services, that "the concepts of market access and national treat-
ment seemed to merge" and "[i]f reservations were allowed on both market access and
national treatment, drawing the line between the market access conditions and national
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treatment conditions might be difficult."' Indeed, market access and national treatment in
trade in services cannot be separated through tariffs and other border measures. There-
fore, it is essential to clarify the relationship between market access and national treatment
under the GATS.
I. Market Access Under the GATS
The market access obligation is clearly identified by the GATS, though it cannot be
found in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).2 It is set forth in Article
XVI of the GATS. The provision reads as follows:
1. With respect to market access through the modes of supply identified in Article I,
each Member shall accord services and service suppliers of any other Member
treatment no less [favorable] than that provided for under the terms, limitations
and conditions agreed and specified in its Schedule.
2. In sectors where market-access commitments are undertaken, the measures
which a Member shall not maintain or adopt either on the basis of a regional
subdivision or on the basis of its entire territory, unless otherwise specified in its
Schedule, are defined as:
(a) limitations on the number of service suppliers whether in the form of numer-
ical quotas, monopolies, exclusive service suppliers or the requirements of an
economic needs test;
(b) limitations on the total value of service transactions or assets in the form of
numerical quotas or the requirement of an economic needs test;
(c) limitations on the total number of service operations or on the total quantity
of service output expressed in terms of designated numerical units in the form
of quotas or the requirement of an economic needs test;
(d) limitations on the total number of natural persons that may be employed in a
particular service sector or that a service supplier may employ and who are
necessary for, and directly related to, the supply of a specific service in the
form of numerical quotas or the requirement of an economic needs test;
(e) measures which restrict or require specific types of legal entity or joint ven-
ture through which a service supplier may supply a service; and
(f) limitations on the participation of foreign capital in terms of maximum per-
centage limit on foreign shareholding or the total value of individual or ag-
gregate foreign investment.3
GATS Article XVI: 1 obliges a Member to accord market access treatment based on its
service schedule. GATS Article XVI:2 gives a list of limitation measures on market access
that a Member should not take unless otherwise specified in its service schedule. From
the structure of the GATS, market access and national treatment are in the same part, i.e.
1. Working Group on Financial Services Including Insurance, Note on the Meeting of 11-13 June 1990,
52, MTN.GNS/FIN/1 (July 5, 1990) [hereinafter Note on the Meeting of 11-13 June 1990].
2. Bernard Hoekman, Assessing the General Agreement on Trade in Services, in THE URUGUAY ROUND AND
THE DEVELOPING COUNRIEs 88, 93 (Will Martin & L. Alan Winters, eds. 1996).
3. General Agreement on Trade in Services art. XVI, Apr. 14, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183 (entered into
force Jan. 1, 1995) [hereinafter GATS].
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Part 111 (Specific Commitments), which means that market access is not a general obliga-
tion under the GATS.
II. National Treatment under the GATS
Structurally, the national treatment article is placed in Part I (Specific Commitments)
of the main text of the GATS, that is, GATS Article XVII. It indicates that national
treatment under the GATS is different from most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment and
transparency, which are placed in Part II of the GATS as general obligations and
principles.
A. GATS ARTICLE XVH:I
Paragraph 1 of GATS Article XVII reads:
In the sectors inscribed in its Schedule, and subject to any conditions and qualifica-
tions set out therein, each Member shall accord to services and service suppliers of
any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of services, treat-
ment no less [favorable] than that it accords to its own like services and service
suppliers.4
Paragraph 1 of GATS Article XVII is the key rule of national treatment in service trade.
The purpose of this paragraph is to prohibit discrimination against foreign services and
service suppliers to the advantage of like services and service suppliers of national origin.5
First, the scope of national treatment is limited in the sectors inscribed in each Member's
service schedule. This means national treatment is inapplicable to the service sectors not
covered by a Member's service schedule, so one Member of the VVTO may take discrimi-
natory measures against services and service suppliers of any other Member in those re-
served sectors without violation of the national treatment rule embodied in GATS Article
XVII. This reservation on national treatment came from the Uruguay Round negotia-
tions on trade in services, particularly from the insistence of developing countries. In this
regard, Peru's view could be the representative view of developing countries: "national
treatment could be interpreted as an objective to be attained in the short, medium and
long-term, sector by sector, activity by activity, depending on the coverage and the com-
mitments deriving from the final framework agreement." 6 Mexico held the same view. 7
This "bottom-up" approach provides more flexibility for Members, especially developing
countries, to protect specific domestic services and service suppliers.
Secondly, even for those sectors inscribed in each Member's service schedule, national
treatment is not necessarily or fully applicable because national treatment may be limited
through "any conditions and qualifications" set out in the Member's service schedule.8
4. Id. art. XVII.
5. Panel Report, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, Com-
plaint by Ecuador, 7.302, VT/DS27/R/ECU (May 22, 1997) [hereinafter EC-Bananas III (Panel)].
6. Group of Negotiations on Services, Note on the Meeting of 17-21 July 1989, J 205, MTN.GNS/24 (Aug.
28, 1989).
7. Id. 202.
8. GATS art. XXVI.
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Thirdly, the beneficiaries of national treatment are both services and service suppliers.
"Service" is defined by GATS Article I(3)(b): "services includes any service in any sector
except services supplied in the exercise of government authority."9 "Service supplier"
means anyperson that supplies a service, 10 while "person" is a legal term that is defined as
either a natural person or a juridical person." Moreover, branches and representative
offices of service suppliers can also be accorded national treatment. 12
Fourthly, the measures relating to national treatment are "all measures affecting the
supply of services." 13 "Measure" constitutes any measure by a Member that is in the form
of a law, regulation, rule, procedure, decision, administrative action, or any other form.1
4
"Supply of services" can be defined by the definition of "supply of a service," which in-
cludes the production, distribution, marketing, sale, and delivery of a service. 15
Fifthly, the comparable domestic counterparts of beneficiaries of national treatment are
a Member's own "like services and service suppliers." 16 But the GATS does not provide
any clear standard of likeness between services and service suppliers of one Member and
those of another. In a note by the WTO Secretariat, it seems that "likeness" in the na-
tional treatment context depends "in principle on attributes of the product or supplier per
se rather than on the means by which the product is delivered."' 7 Some argue that like
services and services suppliers cover "directly competitive or substitutable" services and
services suppliers.'8 It is also difficult to understand the relationships between like ser-
vices and like service suppliers. In EC-Bananas III, the panel's view is "to the extent that
entities provide these like services, they are like service suppliers."' 9 This view almost
equates services and service suppliers, so it was criticized as "an exceedingly broad no-
tion."20 In fact, "like services and service suppliers" is not a pure legal issue, but an issue
mixed with both rules and facts. In Canada-Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, the
appellate body stated that the determination of whether imported and domestic products
9. Id. art I: 3 (c) (stating that "'a service supplied in the exercise of governmental authority' means any
service which is supplied neither on a commercial basis, nor in competition with one or more service
supplies").
10. Id. art. XXVIII(g).
11. Id. art. XXV1II(j).
12. Id. at XXVII(g) n.12 ("Where the service is not supplied directly by a juridical person but through
other forms of commercial presence such as a branch or a representative office, the service supplier (i.e. the
juridical person) shall, nonetheless, through such presence be accorded the treatment provided for service
suppliers under the Agreement. Such treatment shall be extended to the presence through which the service
is supplied and need not be extended to any other parts of the supplier located outside the territory where the
service is supplied."). For the history of this interpretative note, see GATT Secretariat, Statute of Branches as
Service Suppliers, MTN.GNS/W/176 (Oct. 29, 1993).
13. GATS art. XVII.
14. Id. art. XXVIII(a).
15. Id. art. XXVIn(b).
16. Id. art. XVII.
17. WTO Secretariat, The Work Programme on Electronic Commerce, 33, S/C/W/68 (Nov. 16, 1998).
18. Patros C. Mavroidis, Like Products: Some Thoughts at the Positive and Normative Level, in REGULATORY
BARRIERS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD TRADE LAW 125, 126-27 (Thomas
Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis eds. 2000).
19. EC-Bananas III (Panel), supra note 5, 7.322.
20. Werner Zdouc, WTO Dispute Settlement Practice Relating to the GATS, 2 J. INT'L ECON. L. 295, 332-33
(1999).
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are "like products" is a process by which legal rules have to be applied to facts. 21 If this
conclusion is also applicable to the GATS then the "likeness" issue in the GATS must be
construed on a case-by-case basis.
B. GATS ARTICLE XVII:2
Paragraph 2 of GATS Article XVII reads:
"A Member may meet the requirement of paragraph 1 by according to services and
service suppliers of any other Member, either formally identical treatment or for-
mally different treatment so that it accords to its own like services and service
suppliers."
22
The text of paragraph 2 of GATS Article XVII is modeled on a GATT Panel Report
concerning Article HI of the GATT 1947.23 In United States-Section 337 of the TariffAct of
1930,24 the panel used the wording "formally identical." 25 It is generally recognized that
GATT Article III:4 covers both de jure and de facto inconsistency. 26 This is also the case
for GATS Article XVII. Paragraph 2 of GATS Article XVII, in fact, incorporates de jure
and de facto discrimination because the notion of "treatment no less [favorable]" has been
interpreted under paragraph 2 of GATS Article XVII to include both "formally identical
treatment" and "formally different treatment."
27
In the beginning of the Uruguay Round negotiations, there were three options for na-
tional treatment. The first option was the traditional definition of national treatment that
tended to be de jure, supported by Japan and Korea.2H The second option was the equality
of competitive opportunities, supported by the European Communities, Switzerland, Ca-
nada, and the United States.2 9 The third option was the equivalent treatment.30 In the
end, the second option was accepted-that is, national treatment should go beyond de jure
discrimination and guarantee equality of competitive opportunities.
De jure discrimination can easily be identified by comparing the treatment of domestic
and foreign services or service suppliers. But it is difficult to determine de facto discrimi-
21. Appellate Body Report, Canada-Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, at 22, WT/DS31/AB/R
(adoptedJul. 30, 1997).
22. GATS art. XVII:2.
23. Zdouc, supra note 20, at 335; see also Aaditya Mattoo, National Treatment in the GATS, Corner-stone or
Pandora's Box?, 31 J. WORLD TRADE 107, 123 (1997).
24. Panel Report, United States-Section 337 of the TariffAct of1930, 15.11, LJ6439 (Nov. 7, 1989), GAT
B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) at 345, 362 (1990).
25. Id. The panel further stated that the wording "treatment no less [favorable]" in paragraph four of
GATT Article II calls for "effective equality of opportunities for imported products" and that application of
formally identical legal provisions would in practice accord less favorable treatment to imported products, or
application of different legal treatment to imported products may in fact be no less favorable. Id.
26. Id.
27. See EC-Banana III (Panel), supra note 5, 1 7.301 (arguing that paragraphs two and three of GATS
Article XVII do not impose new obligations on WTO Members additional to those contained in paragraph
one).
28. Note on the Meeting of 11-13 June 1990, supra note 1, 1 44.
29. Id. It 44-45, 57, 59; see also Working Group on Financial Services Including Insurance, Note on the
Meeting of 12-13 July 1990, IT 18, 33, 58, MTN.GNS/FIN/2 (Aug. 10, 1990).
30. Note on the Meeting of 11-13 une 1990, supra note 1, 1 44.
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nation. According to paragraph 2 of GATS Article XVII, formally identical treatment
might result in less favorable treatment-that is, de facto discrimination-whereas for-
mally different treatment can result in no less favorable treatment.3 1 Therefore, there are
four possible permutations:
(a) Formally identical treatment results in no less favorable treatment;
(b) Formally identical treatment results in less favorable treatment;
(c) Formally different treatment results in no less favorable treatment; or
(d) Formally different treatment results in less favorable treatment.
In the four permutations, (a) and (c) are compatible with national treatment obligations
of GATS, while (b) and (d) run counter to national treatment obligations. With respect to
(b), it seems that when a complaining party, which is usually a foreign country claiming its
services or services suppliers are discriminated against by a host country, should have the
burden of proof to show that formally identical treatment results in less favorable treat-
ment. On the other hand, with respect to (d), formally different treatment itself may
constitute prima facie evidence that the disputed measure is inconsistent with national
treatment obligations. It is the defendant party's burden to prove that formally different
treatment results in no less favorable treatment, which is also the view of the GATT Panel
in United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930.32
C. GATS ARTICLE XVI:3
Paragraph 3 of GATS Article XVII reads:
"Formally identical or formally different treatment shall be considered to be less
favorable if it modifies the conditions of competition in favor of services or service
suppliers of the Member compared to like services or service suppliers of any other
Member." 33
Paragraph 3 of GATS Article XVII goes further and provides a criterion to determine
what measures will accord less favorable treatment to foreign services or service suppliers.
The criterion is whether the formally identical or formally different treatment "modifies
the conditions of competition in [favor] of services or service suppliers of the Member
compared to like services or service suppliers of any other Member." 34 The wording of
paragraph 3 of GATS Article XVII also originated from GAIT cases.35 Some scholars
even consider that GATS Article XVII:3 "is inspired by the GATT case law." 36 In the
31. GATS art. XVII:2.
32. United States-Section 337, supra note 24, 5.11.
33. GATS art. XVII:3.
34. Id. It is worth noting that NAFTA also uses a similar standard, i.e., "equal competitive opportunities,"
to determine whether the treatment is less favorable in financial services. See North American Free Trade
Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 1405(5), Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) ('A Party's treatment of
financial institutions and cross-border financial service providers of another Party, whether different or iden-
tical to that accorded to its own institutions or providers in like circumstances, is consistent with paragraphs 1
through 3 if the treaunent affords equal competitive opportunities.") (emphasis added).
35. MITsuo MATSUSHITA, THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM & PETROS C. MAVROIDIs, THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION, LAW, PRAc-TcE, AND POLICY 248 (2003).
36. Id.
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case of Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Machinery,37 the panel for the
first time used the wording "modify the conditions of competition." 38 But the notion of
"modification of the conditions of competition" is as vague as the notion of "like services
and service suppliers," all of which can be the focus of disputes in the cases relating to the
GATS under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.3 9 Actually, the new concept of
"modification of conditions of competition" or its predecessor "equality of competitive
opportunities" was intentionally left for the dispute settlement mechanism to interpret.
40
M. Position of Market Access and National Treatment in a Service
Schedule
Because both market access and national treatment obligations are subject to the spe-
cific commitments of a WTO Member, it is necessary to study the general structure of the
Schedule of Specific Commitments on Services. The following table shows the general
structure of a service schedule.
Table 1: General Structure of a Service Schedule in the GATS/ WTO"4
Sector or Limitations on Limitations on Additional





Note: (1)(2)(3)(4) refer to four modes of supply, i.e., cross-border supply, consumption
abroad, commercial presence, and presence of natural persons.
From Table 1, it is clear that there are four columns in each Member's service schedule:
(1) sector column, (2) market access column, (3) national treatment column, and (4) addi-
tional commitments column. 42 On the one hand, any sector or sub-sector that a Member
agrees to open shall be inscribed in the sector column; or, to put it another way, if a sector
37. Panel Report, Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Machinery, T 12, L/833 (Oct. 23,
1958), GATT B.I.S.D. (7th Supp.) at 60, 63 (1959).
38. Id. (stating that the drafters of GATT Article in "intended to cover in paragraph 4 not only the laws
and regulations which directly governed the conditions of sale or purchase but also any laws or regulations
which might adversely modify the conditions ofcsmpetition between the domestic and imported products") (em-
phasis added).
39. See Robert E. Hudec, GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulations: Requiem for an "Aim and Effects"
Test, 32 INT'L LAW. 619, 649 (1998) (arguing that the text of GATS Article XVII(3) introduces an economic
analysis of the competitive impact of the regulation in question).
40. Note on the Meeting of 11-13 June 1990, supra note 1, 59.
41. Trade in Services, Guidelines fir the Scheduling of Specific Commitments Under The General Agreement On
Trade In Services (GATS), Annex 1, S/L/92 (Mar. 28, 2001) [hereinafter 2001 Scheduling Guidelines].
42. Id. (the "Additional Commitments" column neither belong to, nor overlap with, either the "Market
Access" or "National Treatment" columns); see also GATS art. XVII ('Members may negotiate commitments
with respect to measures affecting trade in services not subject to scheduling under Articles XVI orXVIl, including
those regarding qualifications, standards or licensing matters. Such commitments shall be inscribed in a
Member's Schedule.") (emphasis added).
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or sub-sector does not appear in the Schedule, it will be presumed that the Member has
not promised to open the sector or sub-sector. This is the so-called positive or bottom-up
approach.43 On the other hand, the limitations on market access and national treatment
with respect to a specific sector or sub-sector should be inscribed in corresponding col-
umns, in addition to the horizontal commitments applying to trade in services in all sched-
uled service sectors. 44 Otherwise, it will be deemed that there is no limitation on market
access or national treatment for the sector or sub-sector. This is the so-called negative or
top-down approach. 45 A schedule is the combination of the positive approach and the
negative approach, i.e., a hybrid approach.46 Furthermore, for each sector or sub-sector,
the limitation shall be expressed in order of four modes of supply, i.e., cross-border sup-
ply, consumption abroad, commercial presence, and presence of natural persons.47
From the table, it seems that market access column and national treatment column are
separate and independent from each other. In fact, the two columns are connected and
intertwined according to paragraph 2 of Article XX of the GATS.
lV. GATS Article XX:2
A. FouR POSSIBILITIES
Paragraph 2 of GATS Article XX provides: "[M]easures inconsistent with both Articles
XVI and XVII shall be inscribed in the column relating to Article XVI. In this case the
inscription will be considered to provide a condition or qualification to Article XVII as
well." 48 This means that, at least sometimes, some limitation measures inscribed in the
market access column are also limitation measures in the national treatment column. 49
The reason for the overlap is that "market access restrictions in the form of limitations or
conditions on modes of supply are likely to violate national treatment for these modes as
well." 5 0 But the GATS does not state which measures or what kinds of measures entered
in the market access column are also regarded as limitation measures in the national treat-
ment column. Logically, there are four possibilities:
43. See Working Group on the Relationship Between Trade and Investment, Note by the Secretariat: Non-
Discrimination Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment and National Treatment, T 8, WT/WGTI/W/118 (June 4,
2002).
44. GATS art. XX:I.
45. Non-Discrimination, supra note 43, T 8.
46. This hybrid approach, especially the positive approach for service sectors and sub-sectors, has been
criticized by some scholars as one of the weaknesses of the GATS. See, e.g., Dilip K. Das, Trade in Financial
Services and the Role of the GATS: Against the Backdrop of the Asian Financial Crises, 32 J. WORLD TRADE 100
(1998); Pierre Sauv6, Assessing the General Agreement on Trade in Services, Half-Full or Half-Empty?, 29 J.
WORLD TRADE 125 (1995).
47. The four modes of supply are from the definition of "trade in services," which for the purpose of the
GATS are: "(a) from the territory of one Member into the territory of any other Member; (b) in the territory
of one Member to the service consumer of any other Member; (c) by a service supplier of one Member,
through commercial presence in the territory of any other Member; (d) by a service supplier of one Member,
through presence of natural persons of a Member in the territory of any other Member." GATS art. 1:2.
48. See GATS art. XX:2.
49. See id.
50. H.E. Haralambides, M. Westeneng & S. Zou, GATT and Its Effect on Shipping and Ports (KMI/IAME
Conf. on Int'l Trade Relations & World Shipping, Seoul, S. Kor., June 8-10, 1994), http://www.mari-
timeeconomics.com/sites/maritimeeconomics.con/files/downloads/papers/HHGATT%2OSeoul.pdf.
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(1) While there is no limitation in the national treatment column, there may be some
limitations on national treatment inscribed in the market access column;
5 1
(2) While there are some limitations entered in the national treatment column, there
may be more limitations on national treatment inscribed in the market access
column;
(3) While there are some limitations in the national treatment column, there is no
more limitation on national treatment in the market access column;
(4) While there is no limitation in the national treatment column, there is no limita-
tion on national treatment in the market access column. In this case, there is not
any limitation on national treatment in either column.
Of the four possibilities, the last one is the simplest and poses no problem because it
provides the openness and liberalization of the service sector to the greatest extent. All
problems originate from the other possibilities. To address the overlap issue, it is neces-
sary to first answer two preliminary questions.
B. Two PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS
The first preliminary question is how many possible limitation measures may exist in
the market access column. Based on paragraph 2 of GATS Article XVI, a Member may
list as many as six types of limitation measures in its market access column, including:
(1) limitations on the number of service suppliers;
(2) limitations on the total value of service transactions or assets;
(3) limitations on the total number of service operations or the quantity of service
output;
(4) limitations on the total number of natural persons;
(5) limitations on the types of legal entity or joint venture;
(6) limitations on the maximum percentage of foreign shareholding or the total value
of foreign investment.
5 2
Among the six types of limitation measures, the first four concern quantitative limita-
tions on market access, the fifth concerns legal entity or joint venture limitations, and the
sixth covers foreign capital limitations.5 3 According to a statement in the 2001 Scheduling
Guidelines, the list is exhaustive. 54 There is a similar statement in the Guidelines for the
Scheduling of Initial Commitments in Trade in Services circulated during the Uruguay
51. The WTO noted this possibility in 2010: "IThe entry 'none' in the national treatment column may
not necessarily be taken to mean a full commitment to national treatment in cases where market access
limitations also constitute limitations on national treatment. This makes it more difficult to assess the degree
of commitment to national treatment." Council for Trade in Services, Financial Services, Background Note by
the Secretariat, at 38 n.10, S/C/W/312 (Feb. 3, 2010).
52. GATS art. XVI:2; 2001 Scheduling Guidelines, supra note 41, J 12(a)-(f).
53. GATS art. XVI:2; see also Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, 1 214-65, WI/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005) [hereinafter United
States-Gambling] (further discussion of GATS Article XVI).
54. 2001 Scheduling Guidelines, supra note 41, 1 8, 23. In Hoeknan's view, the exhaustive list weakens the
scope of market access obligation because it does not cover other measures that have similar effects like the six
kinds of measures. See Hoekman, supra note 2, at 112.
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Round of negotiations.SS Usually a Member only inscribes some of the six types of limita-
tion measures in its market access column.
The second preliminary question is how many possible limitation measures there are in
the national treatment column. Contrary to Article XVI, GATS Article XVII does not
make an exhaustive list of limitation measures on national treatment.5 6 This fact adds to
the difficulty in distinguishing market access and national treatment limitation measures.
GATS Article XVLI:I uses the wording "all measures affecting the supply of services."5 7
There is no limitation on the scope of "all measures."58 Moreover, paragraph I of GATS
Article XX is of little help to elucidate paragraph 2 of because paragraph 1 uses the words
"terms, limitations and conditions" for market access, and the words "conditions and qual-
ifications" for national treatment.5 9 What is the difference between "terms, limitations
and conditions" and "conditions and qualifications?" There is no clear answer from the
text of the GATS.
V. Scope of GATS National Treatment
Why is it so important to precisely set out the domains of national treatment limitation
measures under GATS Article XVII? The answer is because it is directly related to the
scope of GATS national treatment. Only after finding the complete limitations measures
on national treatment is it then possible to determine the real domains of national treat-
ment obligations under the GATS. Otherwise, national treatment obligations, as well as
GATS Article XVII, would be uncertain and unpredictable.
A. 2001 SCHEDULING GUIDELINES
The 2001 Scheduling Guidelines should not be considered as a legal interpretation of
the GATS.60 In Mexico-Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services,61 the panel found
that "the source, content, and use by negotiators of the Explanatory Note, together with
its later adoption by Members as the Scheduling Guidelines, provides an important ele-
ment with which to interpret the provisions of the GATS."62 It seems the panel overesti-
mated the legal status of the Scheduling Guidelines. In United States-Gambling, the panel
found that the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines could be used as the context of GATS service
55. Group on Negotiations Services, Scheduling of lnitial Commitments in Trade in Services: Erplanatory Note,
4, MTN.GNSIW/164 (Sept. 3, 1993) [hereinafter 1993 Scheduling Guidelines].
56. GATS arts. XVI:2, XVI:I; Council for Trade in Services, Report by the Chairman of the Committee of
Specific Commitments: Consideration of Issues Relating to Article XX.2 of the GATS, Annex I 3, S/C/W/237
(Mar. 24, 2004). The Secretariat of the WTO prepared an illustrative list of national treatnent restrictions,
reported in documentJob No. 3086, but many delegations empathized that the list "was understood to be of a
purely illustrative nature." See Committee on Special Commitments, Note y the Secretariat: Report of the
Meeting Held on 23 and 24 May 2000, IT 4, 13-14, S/CSC/M/15 (June 29, 2000).
57. GATS art. XVI:LI.
58. See id.
59. GATS art. XX:l(a)-(b).
60. 2001 Scheduling Guidelines, supra note 41, 1 23.
61. Panel Report, Mexico-Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services, WT/DS204/R (Apr. 2, 2004).
62. Id. 7.43.
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schedules "within the meaning of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention," 63 but this finding
was overruled. 64 The appellate body found that the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines was
drafted by the GATT Secretariat rather than the parties to the negotiations, so it could
not constitute "an agreement relating to the treaty" and could not be accepted "as an
instrument related to the treaty."65 Thus, the appellate body was of the view that the 1993
Scheduling Guidelines could not be regarded as the context for interpreting GATS service
schedules. 66 Certainly, the appellate body's understanding of the legal status of the 1993
Scheduling Guidelines likewise applies to the 2001 Scheduling Guidelines. Moreover, the
appellate body also found that the 2001 Scheduling Guidelines could not constitute "sub-
sequent practice" within the meaning of Article 31 (3)(b) of the Vienna Convention. 67
In spite of the limitation on the legal status of the 2001 Scheduling Guidelines, it can-
not be denied that the 2001 Scheduling Guidelines is helpful in understanding GATS
service schedules. In United States-Gambling, although the appellate body did not con-
sider the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines as "context" or "subsequent practice" in interpreting
GATS service schedules, it did recognize that the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines could be
"preparatory work of the treaty"68 and also used as supplemental means of interpretation
identified in Article 32 of the Vienna Convention. 69 For the same reason, the 2001
Scheduling Guidelines can also be used as supplemental means of interpretation for
GATS service schedules.
The 2001 Scheduling Guidelines provide: "[1]n accordance with Article XX:2, any dis-
criminatory measure scheduled in the market access column is also to be regarded as
scheduled under Article XVII and subject to the provisions of that Article." 70 This sen-
tence is almost the same as that of the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines. 71 The word "any"
implies that all six limitation measures listed in Article XVI:2 may be regarded as national
treatment limitation measures, provided that they are discriminatory. If a measure sched-
uled in the market access column is non-discriminatory, then it is only a pure market
access limitation measure, without any relationship to national treatment.
In comparison with the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines, the 2001 Scheduling Guidelines
offers a piece of advice: When measures inconsistent with both GATS Articles XVI and
XVII are inscribed in the column relating to Article XVI, Members could indicate that
this is the case for national treatment-for instance, by adding the words "also limits
national treatment" to the market access column.72 But the effect of this advice is re-
strained by the fact that the 2001 Scheduling Guidelines applies only to the service sched-
ules after the adoption of the 2001 Scheduling Guidelines, and the service schedules
63. Panel Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services,
T 6.82, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004).
64. United States-Gambling, supra note 53, T 175, 178.
65. Id. 1 175.
66. Id. 1 178.
67. Id. 1 193.
68. Id. 1 196.
69. Id. 1 197.
70. 2001 Scheduling Guidelines, supra note 41, T 18.
71. 1993 Scheduling Guidelines, supra note 55, T 11 ("[Ifn accordance with the footnotes to Article XVI:2
and Article XX:2, any discriminatory measure scheduled in the market access column is also to be regarded as
scheduled under Article XVII and subject to the provisions of that Article.").
72. 2001 Scheduling Guidelines, supra note 41, 9 18.
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before the adoption of the 2001 Scheduling Guidelines should be understood to have been
drafted based on the 1993 Scheduling Guidelines. 73 Consequently, the 2001 Scheduling
Guidelines has no retroactive effect, so the issue of overlap between GATS Articles XVI
and XVII still remains, especially for those pre-2001 schedules. And even for post-2001
schedules, if some Members fail to indicate the above magic words in the market access
column, the overlap issue still remains.74
B. PRE-ENTRY AND POST-ENTRY MEAsuREs
The overlap issue between market access and national treatment can also be described
as an issue of relating to pre-entry and post-entry. If a Member takes a pre-entry measure
not inscribed in either the market access column or the national treatment column but
affecting the supply of services, is it in violation of national treatment obligations under
GATS Article XVII? In other words, are GATS national treatment obligations binding on
post-entry measures only, or on both post-entry and pre-entry measures?
In this connection, the GATT national treatment and its long-term practice provide no
clue. According to GATT Article M: 1, national treatment obligations are on "internal
taxes, and other internal charges, and laws, regulations and requirements affecting the
internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products,
and internal quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of prod-
ucts." 75 Therefore, limitation measures on national treatment in the context of the
GATT are all post-entry measures. The pre-entry measures are mainly subject to GATT
Article II (Schedules of Concessions) and Article XI (General Elimination of Quantitative
Restrictions).76 There is no overlap between GATT Article II and GATT1 Articles II or
XI. They are separated by a pre-entry or a post-entry standard. Only after crossing the
border of a Member can a product be entitled to national treatment. Therefore, the
GAIT experience cannot provide a clue to the overlap issue between market access limi-
tations and national treatment limitations under the GATS.
GATS Article XVII:1 states: "[E]ach Member shall accord to services and service sup-
pliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply of services,
treatment no less [favorable] than that it accords to its own like services and service suppli-
ers." 77 From the text of GATS Article XVII:I, it is unclear whether "all measures" in-
cludes pre-entry and post-entry measures or just post-entry measures. The key to
determining the scope of GATS national treatment is to interpret the ordinary meaning of
"all measures affecting the supply of services."
In EC-Bananas III, the panel pointed out:
[T]he drafters [of the GATS] consciously adopted the terms 'affecting' and 'supply of
a service' to ensure that the disciplines of the GATS would cover any measure bearing
73. Id. at 3 n.1.
74. It is noteworthy that the 2001 Scheduling Guidelines is not an inherent part of the WTO Agreement;
therefore, it is not legally binding on WTO Members.
75. General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade, art. 3, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [herein-
after GATT].
76. Mattoo, supra note 23, at 112.
77. GATS art. XVIL
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upon conditions of competition in supply of a service, regardless of whether the mea-
sure directly govern or indirectly affects the supply of the service.
78
The appellate body in the case supported the panel's opinion and further held:
In our view, the use of the term "affecting" reflects the intent of the drafters to give a
broad reach to the GATS. The ordinary meaning of the word "affecting" implies a
measure that has "an effect on", which indicates a broad scope of application. This
interpretation is further reinforced by the conclusions of previous Panels that the
term affecting" in the context of Article 171 of the GATT is wider in scope than such
terms as "regulating" or "governing."
79
In addition, the appellate body also agreed with the panel on the point that GATS Article
XXVIII(c) does not "narrow the meaning of the term 'affecting' to 'in respect of."' 80 In
Canada-Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, the panel reiterated that GATS
Article I "does not a priori exclude any measure from the scope of application" of the
GATS., 1
Summing up, the above cases about the scope of "measures" in the GATS are all in
support of a conclusion that the notion of "measures" in the GATS is not a narrow one,
but a broad one.82 Therefore, the ordinary meaning of Article XVII, "all measures affect-
ing the supply of services" could include any measure that may affect the supply of ser-
78. EC-Bananas III (Panel), supra note 5, 7.281 (emphasis added).
79. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Ba-
nanas, 220, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997) [hereinafter EC-Bananas III (Appellate)].
80. Id. at 220. See also GATS art. XXVIH(c) ("For the purpose of this Agreement: 'measures by Members
affecting trade in services' include measures in respect of (i) the purchase, payment or use of a service; (ii) the
access to and use of, in connection with the supply of a service, services which are required by those Members
to be offered to the public generally; (iii) the presence, including commercial presence, of persons of a Mem-
ber for the supply of a service in the territory of another Member.").
81. Panel Report, Canada-Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Ind"srey, 10.234, WTIDS139/R
(Feb. 11, 2000). The panel further stated:
The determination of whether a measure affects trade in services cannot be done in abstract terms
in isolation from examining whether the effect of such a measure is consistent with the Member's
obligations and commitments under the GATS. In this case, the determination of whether ...
measures affecting trade in services within the meaning of Article I of the GATS should be done
on the basis of the determination of whether these measures constitute less [favorable] treatment for the
services and service suppliers of... other Members as compared to domestic ones (Article XVII).
Id. (emphasis added). But this interpretation was overruled by the appellate body. Appellate Body Report,
Canada-Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry, 151, WT/DS139/AB/R (May 31, 2000). The
appellate body stated:
The fundamental structure and logic of Article : 1, in relation to the rest of the GATS, require
that determination of whether a measure is, in fact, covered by the GATS must be made before the
consistency of that measure with any substantive obligation of the GATS can be assessed.
Id. In the Appellate Body's view, the panel erred in its interpretation approach at this point. In my opinion,
the appellate body is correct because whether a measure is within the scope of the GATS should be decided
before determining whether a measure is inconsistent with the obligation of the GATS. Approaching from
the opposite direction is like putting the cart before the horse.
82. In accordance with the Vienna Convention, WTO practice, by way of WTO dispute settlement mech-
anisms, could be the resource of interpretation of the WTO agreements. See Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, art. 31(3)(b), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (stating that treaty interpretation shall take into
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vices, no matter how or when the service is supplied. Moreover, as acknowledged by the
WTO Committee on Specific Commitments, in the six exhaustive categories of market
access limitations, there are some restrictions with post-entry effect, such as GATS Arti-
cles XVI:2(b) ("limitations on the total value of service transactions or asset") and XVI:2(c)
("limitations on the total number of service operations or the quantity of service out-
put").83 Thus, national treatment obligations under the GATS could be binding on both
pre-entry and post-entry measures. The extension of national treatment from post-entry
to pre-entry is regarded as a "revolution" by many countries.8 4
One argument against the broad national treatment obligations is that it would reduce
the meaning or effect of GATS Article XVI and make it "address primarily non-discrimi-
natory market access restrictions." 85 Actually, a broad national treatment interpretation is
not incompatible with discriminatory market access restrictions. If market access restric-
tions can be divided into "discriminatory" and "non-discriminatory" measures, then the
discriminatory measures are national treatment limitations as well as market access limita-
tions. It is possible that some market access measures are discriminatory by their nature-
for example, limitations on the participation of foreign capital-but it does not mean that
they are not in violation of market access obligations just because they are in violation of
national treatment obligations under GATS Article XVII. The presumption of GATS
Article XX:2 is that a limitation measure may be inconsistent with both Articles XVI and
XVII; it does not mean that if a limitation measure is inconsistent with Article XVII it will
not fall under Article XVI as well. Indeed, a broad national treatment interpretation could
increase the applicable scope of Article XVII, but at the same time, it does not decrease
the scope of Article XVI. If a Member's measure is not inconsistent with both market
access commitments and national treatment commitments, another Member may com-
plain against it based on both Articles XVII and XVI.
VI. Two Extreme Examples: Unbound/None or None/Unbound
A. DEBATE ON THE ISSUE OF UNBouND/NoNE OR NONE/UNBOUND
The relationship of GATS Articles XVI and XVII, together with Article XX:2, is espe-
cially unclear under two extreme circumstances. The first circumstance is an "Unbound"
entry in the market access column, with a "None" entry in the national treatment column.
The second circumstance is a "None" entry in the market access column and an "Un-
bound" entry in the national treatment column. In fact, the two circumstances are two
sides of the same coin. This analysis will only focus on the first example for the purpose of
convenience and conciseness. If the first issue were resolved, then the second issue would
also be readily solved. Thus, the two questions can be simplified into the following one:
If a Member entered "Unbound" in the market access column and "None" in the national
account "any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the
parties").
83. Committee on Specific Commitments, Note by the Secretariat: Revision of Scheduling Guidelines, T 15, S/
CSC/W/19 (Mar. 5, 1999).
84. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva, Switz., May 1999, National Treat-
ment, at 4, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/HIT/1 1 (Vol. IV).
85. Mattoo, supra note 23, at 116.
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treatment column, could the Member maintain any discriminatory measure of market ac-
cess? In other words, if there is a conflict between a market access limitation and a na-
tional treatment requirement, which one shall prevail? Should "Unbound" override
"none," or should "None" override "Unbound?" This question has been highly debated
in the meetings of the Council for Trade in Services. 86
In one view, if a Member enters "Unbound" in the market access column, then the
Member has the right to introduce any market access limitations, discriminatory or non-
discriminatory, although there is a "None" entry in the national treatment column.
87
Based on this view, "Unbound" overrides "None." The representative country holding
this view is Brazil. 88
On the contrary, according to another view, "Unbound" under the market access col-
umn and "None" under the national treatment column mean that the Member could not
introduce any discriminatory measure falling under Article XVI."89 Based on this view,
"None" overrides "Unbound." Switzerland prefers this view.90
To address the issue of conflict between "Unbound" and "None," it is necessary to first
determine whether GATS Article XX:2 applies to such a situation. 91 Switzerland used the
literal reading method, arguing that "Unbound" in a service schedule "neither constituted
an "inscribed measure, nor a condition or qualification," 92 so this issue could not be re-
solved through GATS Article XX:2. This non-application of Article XX:2 to the "Un-
bound"/"None" situation was also supported by Australia and the European
Communities.93 Brazil also agreed that Article XX:2 did not apply to the situation but it
pointed out that the non-application of XX:2 itself could not resolve the "Unbound"/
"None" issue. 94
B. APPROACHES TO ADDRESS THE OVERLAP IssuE
There are several approaches to address the overlap issue.
86. Council for Trade in Services, Note by the Secretariat: Report of the Meeting Held on 5 June 2002, 1 19, S/
C/M/60 (July 10, 2002); see also Council for Trade in Services, Note by the Secretariat: Report of the Meeting Held
on 17.July 2002, 1 8, S/C/M/61 (Sept. 23, 2002); Council for Trade in Services, Note by the Secretariat: Report
of the Meeting Held on 25 October 2002, 1$ 85-94, S/C/M/63 (Nov. 11, 2002); Council for Trade in Services,
Note by the Secretariat: Report of the Meeting Held on 28 February 2003, 8-17, S/C/M/65 (Mar. 21, 2003)
[hereinafter Council Report February]; Council for Trade in Services, Note by the Secretariat: Report of the Meet-
ing Held on 14 May 2003, IT 21-42, S/C/M/66 (June 18, 2003) [hereinafter Council Report May].
87. Council Report February, supra note 86, 8.
88. Id.
89. Id. 9.
90. Id. 15; see also Council for Trade in Services, Communication from Switzerland: Consideration of Issues
Relating toArticleXX.-2 of the GATS, 1 19, S/C/W/237 (Nov. 27, 2003) (arguing that this approach is the only
one that never shows any internal inconsistency).
91. Council Report May, supra note 86, 22.
92. Id.
93. Id. IT 23-24.
94. Id. 25.
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1. Approach I
Some would argue that the best way to approach the overlap issue is to separate the
scope of GATS Articles XVI and XVII and make them "mutually exclusive."95 This ap-
proach could be divided into two sub-approaches: Approach 1.1 and Approachl.2.
Approach 1.1 is that the overlap areas should be allocated to the market access col-
umn.96 Under this approach, GATS Article XVI would cover all measures referred to
under paragraphs 2(a) to (f) of Article XVI, no matter whether they were discriminatory or
non-discriminatory. 97 Thus, Article XVI would become the lex specialis.98 A typical exam-
ple for this purpose is as follows:
Under the situation of an Unbound in Market access and a None in National Treat-
ment, any of the six types of limitations could be introduced, regardless of whether in
non-discriminatory or discriminatory form. In the inverse situation where a commit-
ment existed in the Market Access column, with an Unbound in the national treat-
ment column, the Member would not be permitted to introduce any discriminatory
market access type measures. 99
Approach 1.2 is that the overlap areas should be allocated to the national treatment
column.' 00 Under this sub-approach, Article XVI covers only non-discriminatory mea-
sures, while Article XVII covers discriminatory measures. A typical example for the pur-
pose is as follows:
In case of an Unbound in market access and a commitment in national treatment, the
Member would only be permitted to take market access measures in their non-dis-
criminatory form. If the Unbound existed in the national treatment column, with a
None under market access, the Member would be free to introduce any discrimina-
tory measure, including any of those measures mentioned in Article XVI:2(a)-(f) in
their discriminatory form.' 01
2. Approach 2
Another approach is to establish a priority between the unbound entry and the bound
entry containing specific commitments. 0 2 This approach can also be divided into two
sub-approaches: Approach 2.1 and Approach 2.2.
According to Approach 2.1, the unbound entry prevails over the bound entry contain-
ing specific commitments. 0 3 A typical example for this purpose is as follows:
95. Julian Arkell, The General Agreement on Trade in Services: A Review of Its Textual Clarity and Consistency,
27 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISKS & INs. 337, 346 (2002).
96. Council for Trade in Services, Note by the Chairman: Consideration of Issues Relating to Article XX:2 of the




100. Id. T 17.
101. Id.
102. Id. IT 18-19.
103. Id. 1 18.
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An Unbound in the market access column with a commitment in national treatment
would allow the Member to apply any discriminatory market access limitation ...
[Ain Unbound in national treatment together with a None in the market access col-
umn would permit the Member to apply any discriminatory measure, including those
falling under Article XVI:2.104
According to Approach 2.2, the bound entry containing specific commitments prevails
over the unbound entry.' 0 5 A typical example for this purpose is as follows:
[A] commitment in the national treatment column, together with an Unbound under
market access would allow the Member only to operate measures falling under mar-
ket access in its non-discriminatory form ... [A] commitment under market access,
and an Unbound under national treatment [would allow] the Member... [to] operate
market access measures only to the extent scheduled.
10 6
3. Approach 3
The third approach is to merge market access with national treatment and mix the
limitations into the national treatment column. As Hoekman argues, the problem is that
some quantitative limitations are non-discriminatory and therefore unable to be classified
into national treatment limitations, 10 7 making this way of merger seem unfeasible.
4. Approach 4
It is noteworthy that China's service schedule uses a schedule-based approach that tries
to avoid the overlap issue by adding special statements to the service schedule, for exam-
ple, by inscribing "None, except for discriminatory measures falling under Article XV:2"
in the national treatment column, or by inscribing "Unbound, except for measures falling
also under Article XVII" into the market access column.108 In the national treatment
column of China's service schedule, there are some statements, such as: "Unbound except
for the measures referred to in the market access column,"' 10 9 or "[e]xcept for ... limita-
tions ... listed in the market access column, foreign financial institution may do business
... with foreign invested enterprises ... [o]therwise, none."" 0 But this "'schedule-based'




107. Bernard Hoektnan, Market Access Through Multilateral Agreement: From Goods to Services, 15 WORLD
ECON. 707, 720 (1992).
108. Consideration of Issues Relating to Article XX:2 of the GATS, supra note 56, 20.
109. Working Party on the Accession of China, Schedule CLII - The People's Republic of China, Part II -
Schedule of Specific Commitments on Services List ofArticle Ii MFN Exemptions, tNlJ, WT/ACC/CHN/49/Add.2
(Oct. 1, 2001).
110. Id. tbl.7(B).
I11. Consideration of Issues Relating to Article XX2 of the GATS, supra note 56, T 20.
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report in China-Certain Measures Affecting Electronic Payment Services1 12 provides a good
example of the difficulties of the issue.
VII. The WTO Case of China-Electronic Payment Services
In China-Electronic Payment Services, one of the issues focused on the overlap between
market access and national treatment. China inscribed the term "Unbound" in the market
access column, and "None" in the column entitled "Limitations on National Treatment."
The recent W%7TO panel report on China-Electronic Payment Services discussed:
The United States argues that China's full national treatment commitment implies
that measures inconsistent with both Articles XVI and XVII are subject to China's
obligations under Article XVII. China, on the other hand, argues that its absence of
market access commitment means that such measures are not subject to any obliga-
tions it may have under Article XVII.113
China argued that "the measures described in Article XVI:2 cannot simultaneously be
subject to Article XVII, without wholly disregarding the basis upon which market access
and national treatment commitments were scheduled."114 In China's view:
Article XX:2 establishes ... the "order of precedence" .. . in [favor] of Article XVI, as
well as the principle of effectiveness of treaty interpretation (effet utile) . . .[and]
Article XVI governs "all aspects" of the measures described in Article XVI:2(a)-(O,
including any respect in which such a measure is potentially discriminatory. Articles
XVI and XVII are thus "mutually exclusive" in their respective spheres of
application.115
Obviously, China supported the Approach 1.1. The European Union, Japan, Australia,
and Ecuador were on China's side.]16
On the contrary, in the view of the United States, "Article XVI:2 ... does not extend to
restrictions that are discriminatory.17 "For the United States, Article XX:2 does not
make Articles XVI and XVII 'mutually exclusive' in their respective spheres of applica-
tion," so "an 'Unbound' inscription for market access, combined with a 'None' for na-
tional treatment, 'carves out' only overall quantitative limitations, not limitations that
discriminate against foreign suppliers."1s Obviously, the United States supported Ap-
proach 2.2. Guatemala sided with the United States. 119
The panel states that the ordinary meaning of the term "None" "in clear when read in
conjunction with the title of this column in which the term appears," and "the entry of
'None' in the national treatment column suggests that China would be committed to pro-
112. Panel Report, China-Certain Measures Affecting Electronic Payment Services, WT/DS413/R (July 16,
2012) [hereinafter China-Electronic Payment Services].
113. Id. 7.655.





119. Id. 1 7.648.
VOL. 46, NO. 4
MARKET ACCESS & NATIONAL TREATMENT UNDER GATS 1063
viding full national treatment."120 Because "the term 'Unbound' indicate[s] an absence of
constraint or obligation... China is under no constraint or obligation to grant market
access within the terms of Article XVI:2."121 The panel "view[ed] Article XX:2 as a fur-
ther indication that measures within the scope of any of the subparagraphs of Article
XVI:2 can have discriminatory aspects." 122
In the panel's view, the scope of Articles XVI and XVII are not mutually exclusive.
Both provisions can apply equally to a single measure. 2 3 The special rule in Article XX:2
provides a simpler requirement: A Member need only make a single inscription of the
measure under the market access column, which then provides an implicit limitation
under national treatment. 124 The wording of Article XX:2 indicates that what is inscribed
in the market access column is a "measure" that, in the situation of conflict contemplated
by Article XX:2, must encompass aspects that are inconsistent with both Articles XVI and
XVII.125 In this way, a single inscription under Article XVI of a "measure" will provide a
limitation as well under Article XVII.126
The panel also reasoned that it would be incongruous if an inscription of "Unbound"
had an effect different from that of inscribing individually all possible measures within the
six categories foreseen under Article XVI:2.127 Any other interpretation would elevate
form over substance.' 28 Thus, under the panel's assessment, an inscription of the term
"Unbound" in the market access column is, for all purposes, an inscription of "measures"
specifically defined by Article XVI:2.129 Because a Member may not maintain or adopt
these "measures" unless otherwise specified in its schedule, Article XX:2 consequently
applies to situations where a Member has inscribed "Unbound" in the market access col-
umn of its schedule.' 30 Therefore, China's inscription of "Unbound" in the market access
column of its schedule is the functional equivalent of an inscription of all possible mea-
sures falling within Article XVI:2.'
3 1
Articles XVII and XVI both encompass inconsistencies brought by an "Unbound" in-
scription in the market access column. 32 As a result, under Article XX:2, the inscription
of "Unbound" will "provide a condition or qualification to Article XVII as well," allowing
China to maintain measures that are inconsistent with both Articles XVI and XVHI.33 By
having an inscription of "Unbound" for subsector (d) in mode one under Article XVI, and
a corresponding "None" under Article XVII, China has indicated that it is free to main-
tain the full range of limitations expressed in the six categories of Article XVI:2, whether






125. See id. T 7.655.
126. Id. 7.659.
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The panel found that the obligations in Article XVI:2 can extend to measures that are
also within the scope of Article XVII, meaning that China may introduce or maintain any
measures falling within Article XVI:2, including those that may be discriminatory within
the meaning of Article XVII.135 By inscribing "Unbound" under market access, China
reserves the right to maintain any type of measure within the six categories falling under
Article XVI:2, regardless of its inscription in the national treatment column. 36 Accord-
ingly, the panel found that China's ability to maintain any measures via its market access
entry was inconsistent with Articles XVI and XVII. 137
The panel also disagreed with China's take on "order of precedence," reasoning that
neither Articles XVI nor XVII are subordinate to each other.138 Rather, the panel found
Article XX:2 provides scheduling primacy for market access column entries. 139 Therefore,
a WTO Member who does not want to make a commitment under Article XVI, discrimi-
natory or non-discriminatory, may do so by inscribing the term "Unbound" in the market
access column of its schedule. 140
VIII. Concluding Remarks
Although the panel in China-Electronic Payment Services supported China's view on the
relationship between "Unbound" market access and "None" national treatment, the
panel's approach is different from China's approach. China chose a "mutually exclusive"
approach, i.e., Approach 1.1, while the panel said that Article XVI and XVII were not
"mutually exclusive." China's view of the "order of precedence" in favor of Article XVI
was also rejected by the panel. While it denied a hierarchy between Articles XVI and
XVII, the panel did create a "scheduling primacy" for entries in the market access column
based on Article XX:2. As a matter of fact, the panel adopted Approach 2.1. Although
China and the panel chose different approaches, the final effect was the same. All roads
lead to Rome.
China-Electronic Payment Services is the first WTO case touching on the sophisticated
issue of the relationship between market access and national treatment under the GATS.
This issue will continue unless the WATO Members choose an approach that can totally
eliminate the overlap between Articles XVI and XVII, along with the overlap between
market access measures and national treatment measures. So far, how to separate market
access and national treatment has been a difficult question. It is undisputed that some
market access measures are also discriminatory by their nature, so those measures may be
inconsistent with both market access obligations and national treatment obligations. How
to classify those measures is the key to addressing the issue of Articles XVI and XVI. A
simple, arbitrary approach, e.g., "mutually exclusive," or "scheduling primacy" in favor of
market access entry, does not seem persuasive. The panel that interpreted the relationship
had to rely heavily on inferences and implications. Too many inferences and implications
may significantly reduce the credibility of the panel's conclusion on this issue.
135. Id. 1 7.654.
136. Id. 1 7.663.
137. Id. T 7.665.
138. See id. J 7.660.
139. See id.
140. Id. 7.664.
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The essence of the relationship between market access and national treatment is how far
a Member can go under or beyond its current service schedule. Obviously, Approach 1.1
gives a Member too much discretion to introduce new restrictive measures. The effect of
Approach 2 depends on the hierarchy between unbound and bound entry. If the unbound
entry prevails over the bound, a Member would have extra power to make discriminatory
measures. If the bound entry prevails over the unbound, the Member would have no such
power. The complicated relationship between market access and national treatment
under the GATS is a reflection of the complicated issue of the separation of powers be-
tween Members and the WTO, and of the separation of powers between national law and
international law, which determines the degree of liberalization of trade in service. The
overlap between market access and national treatment under the GATS is a fact, and how
to clarify the overlap is more a choice of conservatism or liberalism than a technical
problem.
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